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Abstract
Background: Studies on the mental health of refugees have tended to focus upon the impact of traumatic
experiences in the country of origin, and acculturation processes in exile. The effects of crises in the country of
origin on refugees living in exile have been little studied. This article examines how the final stages of the civil war
in Sri Lanka in 2009 influenced members of pro-LTTE Tamil NGO’s in Norway.
Method: Ethnographic fieldwork methods were employed within Tamil NGO’s in the two largest cities in Norway
between November 2008 and June 2011.
Results: The findings suggest that collective resources became severely drained as a result of the crisis, severely
disrupting the fabric of social life. Public support from the majority community remained scarce throughout the
crisis.
Conclusions: The study suggests that there is a need for public support to exile groups indirectly affected by
man-made crises in their country of origin.
Keywords: Tamils, disaster, resource loss, coping, Norway, refugees
Background
In the final stages of the civil war between the Libera-
tion Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Government
of Sri Lanka in 2009, hundreds of thousands of Tamil
civilians became trapped in the line of fire inside an
area roughly the same as New York City’s Central Park.
Tamils living in exile in Norway were powerless to pre-
vent that tens of thousands of Tamil civilians were
killed, many of them friends and family. This article
draws on ethnographic fieldwork within pro-LTTE
Tamil NGO’s in Norway during the period, and exam-
ines how they were affected by the crisis in their home
country while living in exile.
Research on the mental health of refugees has tended
to focus on trauma induced by pre migration personal
experiences in the home country (e.g., [1]), or on issues
related to post migration acculturation and adaptation in
the “host” society (e.g., [2,3]). However, when disasters
occur, people originating from the affected area may
find themselves affected in a number of ways although
they are physically remote from the incident [4]. Never-
theless, the effects of crises that occur in the country of
origin while refugees are comfortably situated in exile
have been little studied. A few studies have focused on
the impact of natural disasters on individual refugees
[4-6]. The studies show that more than a year after the
2004 tsunami in Sri Lanka and Indonesia, refugees in
exile who had lost friends or family in the disaster still
had strong emotional reactions.
Previous research has suggested that within commu-
nities directly impacted by disasters, the social response
may depend on the type of disaster [7,8]. While natural
disasters may sometimes build a sense of community in
which people help each other cope, man-made disasters
may often destroy collective feelings of trust and
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any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.security and create ambiguity and dissent in the affected
communities. Furthermore, t h el o s so fas e n s eo fm a s -
tery and belief in a just world may aggravate stress and
weaken people’s stress resilience [9]. The result may be
the development of subcultures of distress characterized
by beliefs that may exacerbate and prolong the suffering
of people attempting to cope with man-made disasters
[10]. What is suggested here is that man-made disasters
in the home country may potentially affect exiled refu-
gees even more adversely than natural disasters. Yet
there has been very little scientific focus on this.
The civil war in Sri Lanka
The civil war in Sri Lanka has been a violent conflict
going on for more than 25 years. Around 1 million
Tamil refugees are currently estimated to live outside
Sri Lanka. Experiencing discrimination from the Singha-
lese majority, the Tamil minority on the island raised a
claim for a separate state in the 1970’s. By the early
1980’s the conflict eventually escalated into a full
fledged civil war between Singhalese governmental
forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE). In 2002, a Norwegian-brokered cease fire agree-
ment was signed, and the LTTE managed to establish a
de facto Tamil state in the north east of Sri Lanka. After
continued violations of the cease fire agreement on both
sides, the government unilaterally abrogated the cease
fire agreement in 2008, and the conflict escalated drasti-
cally again. As a result of an effective military campaign
by the governmental forces, the remaining LTTE cadres
along with 300 000 Tamil civilians became trapped
within an area of a few square kilometres in the north
east of the island.
On May 17
th 2009, while Norwegians celebrated their
National Day, the LTTE admitted military defeat, but
their leadership was subsequently found dead. Tens of
thousands of civilians were also killed in the last phase
of the conflict, with estimates as high as 75 000 [11].
War crimes have been reported on both sides. Credible
evidence has been presented of intentional shelling of
civilians, hospitals and humanitarian operations by gov-
ernmental forces, while the LTTE were reported to have
caused intentional infliction of suffering on civilians
[11,12]. After the victory, the Sri Lankan government
interned both LTTE survivors and Tamil civilians in
military controlled camps behind barbed wire, continu-
ing to bar journalists and international aid workers.
Reports of rape, abductions, general violence, malnour-
ishment and outbreaks of disease within the camps
nevertheless made it to international media [e.g. [13]]
and have later been verified [12].
In March 2009, the Norwegian Institute of Public
Health issued a report of concern to the Norwegian
authorities, stating concern for the impact of the
intensified civil war in Sri Lanka on the mental health
and social integration of Tamil refugees in Norway. On
background of this report of concern, it was necessary
to properly document the impact of the disaster on the
Tamil community.
COR theory
Research has shown that although many victims of nat-
ural disasters are not necessarily directly exposed to life
threatening or other traumatic experiences, they may suf-
fer from adverse resource loss in the post disaster period.
Resource loss may include scarcity of food, damage to
property, and changes in personal characteristics (e.g.,
feelings of hopelessness) [14,15]. Traditional stress mod-
els, such as Lazarus and Folkman’s stress-appraisal-cop-
ing theory, tend to define strain in terms of individuals’
appraisals of events or situations as stressful [16]. In con-
trast, Conservation of resources theory (COR), as devel-
oped by Stevan Hobfoll [17,18] is based on the tenet that
stress occurs when resources are lost or threatened or
when individuals fail to replenish resources after signifi-
cant investment. In principle, resource loss is more sali-
ent than resource gain, and loss may result in further loss
cycles. As people lose resources, they become decreas-
ingly capable of resisting threats to further resource loss.
Resource loss in connection with man-made disasters
such as war and terrorist attacks has been found to
adversely affect individual functioning and cause psycho-
logical distress (e.g., [19-21]).
Resources are defined by Hobfoll [18] as valued
objects, characteristics, conditions and energies which
people strive to obtain and protect. In the current study,
the main interest is in conditions and characteristics.
These resources are particularly important since they
provide access to other resources. Conditions such as
social support or employment are resources that may
lay the foundation for access to other resources. For
instance, employment provides access to financial
resources. Cultural Characteristics is used in this study
to refer to cultural values and modes of organization
that may indirectly provide access to collective
resources. For instance, as will be shown, the common
aspiration for a separate Tamil state in Sri Lanka has
enabled Tamil exile communities to organize themselves
effectively across caste, regional and religious distinc-
tions. However, while cultural rituals may support the
individual, repair rents in the social fabric, and re-estab-
lish the group during stressful times; massive upheavals
may also result in cultural disintegration bereaving indi-
viduals of their protective cultural resources. This may
have psychological consequences which may strongly
affect people’s lifestyles in the future [22].
In this theoretical framework, stress and coping are
not merely linked to subjective cognitive processes, but
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their resources. This provides a good starting point to
explore how the disaster in the country of origin
affected the Tamil social fabric of life in exile.
The current study
According to COR theory, one would expect that even
though Tamils living abroad were not directly exposed
to life threatening experiences, the Vanni crisis would
be likely to produce serious losses or threats within dis-
tinct resource categories. The current study focuses on
the following research questions:
(1) In which ways do members of pro-LTTE Tamil
NGO’s in Norway experience loss of or threats to col-
lective resources such as conditions and cultural charac-
teristics during the crisis in their country of origin?
(2) In what ways do these collective resource threats
and losses affect collective coping abilities?
Method
Approach
There was a need for an exploratory approach which
would enable us to grasp the crisis from the perspective
of the participants. Previous ethnographic fieldwork
conducted among Tamils in Norway since 2006 had
already established a level of trust between this
researcher and Tamil informants, providing convenient
access to the field during the last stages of the civil war
in Sri Lanka. Between November 2008 and April 2011,
participant observation was conducted among members
of pro-LTTE Tamil NGO’si nN o r w a yw i t has t a r t i n g
point in the Tamil Resource and Counselling Centre
(TRCC) and the Norwegian Tamil Health Organization
(NTHO) in Oslo and Bergen. Note that although mem-
b e r so ft h e s eo r g a n i z a t i o n sm a yb ep r o - L T T E ,i td o e s
not necessarily indicate in any way that they constitute
parts of the LTTE as such.
Fieldwork setting
Norway is one of the most sparsely populated countries
in Europe, rich in reserves of petroleum, natural gas,
seafood, forests, and hydropower. The Scandinavian wel-
fare model is designed to secure universal health care,
subsidized higher education and a broad social security
system for the country’s population of 4.9 million peo-
ple. According to the Human Development Index, Nor-
way has consistently had one the highest human
development and highest standard of living in the world
during the last decade. Norwegians tend to view them-
selves as egalitarian people with a culture based on
democratic principles, a trait which in the Norwegian
public is often contrasted with the cultures of immi-
grants from non-western countries [23,24]. According to
Statistics Norway as of January 2010 immigrants from
216 countries constitute a little over 11 percent of the
total population. As of January 2007 there were 12 750
persons with Sri Lankan background in Norway, the
majority Tamils. About 6000 of them live in Oslo and
1000 live in Bergen, the second largest city. A referen-
dum conducted among Tamils in Norway in 2009 sug-
gested that 99 percent of the voters endorsed the call
for a sovereign Tamil state in Sri Lanka. According to
the published results of the referendum, eighty percent
of the eligible voters turned out for the referendum.
This may imply that at least at the time, LTTE suppor-
ters may have formed a majority of the Tamil commu-
nity [25].
Pro-LTTE NGO’ss u c ha sT R C Ca n dN T H Oa r e
important social arenas which provide Tamils with an
opportunity to make culturally meaningful contributions
for the well-being of Tamils in both the diaspora and in
Sri Lanka [26]. TRCC aims to provide services and tui-
tion which enables the integration of Tamils in the Nor-
wegian society, while NTHO initiates health projects
among Tamils in Sri Lanka and Norway. These NGO’s
will be further described in the Findings section. Note
that unlike in many other countries, the LTTE is not an
illegal organization in Norway.
Participants and recruitment
Key informants consisted of 14 well-educated men and 6
well-educated women between 30-50 years old who had
lived in the country for 10 years or more, and were mem-
bers of Tamil NGO’s in Norway. Most of these openly
supported the LTTE, but to various degrees. Further
recruitment of informants was characterised by a natura-
listic “snowball” effect resulting from following flows of
interaction among members of these organizations, and
among these and other Tamils. Key informants recruited
informants, who in turn recruited further informants and
so forth. This process provided access to information
from a broad spectrum of members of Tamil NGO’si n
Norway, including TRCC and NTHO, as well as mem-
bers of The Economic Consultancy House (TECH),
Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO), Tamil Youth
Organization (TYO), Tamil Women’s Organization
(TWO) and The Tamil Coordinating Committee (TCC).
I also had the opportunity to talk to members of- and fol-
low activities within the newly formed Transnational
Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE), and the National
Council of Tamil Eelam (NCET). Participants were given
oral information about the study and asked to give oral
consent to participate in it.
Procedure
Fieldwork consisted in participation in regular activities
within the community (i.e. meetings, demonstrations,
etc), and in-depth conversations with informants about
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Reports of the conflict in international media and con-
tent on Tamil websites and news blogs were reviewed to
identify discourse patterns. The informants’ responses to
these reports and websites also came into focus. All key
informants spoke Norwegian fluently, and helped inter-
pret conversations in Tamil during the fieldwork. The
role of the ethnographer in this context was that of a
trusted resource person who aided in organizing inter-
ventions to help despairing Tamils, tried to raise aware-
ness about the crisis in Sri Lanka in Norwegian media,
and provided emotional and instrumental social support
(e.g., independent Chief Election Commissioner for the
2010 elections for the Transnational Government of
Tamil Eelam).
An analysis of data from previous ethnographic field-
work among Tamils in Norway [27] enabled the identifi-
cation of collective resources (conditions and cultural
characteristics) within the Tamil community prior to the
crisis. The next step was to investigate how these dis-
tinct resources were affected by the crisis. For instance,
did the crisis result in changes in the way these Tamils
organized themselves collectively? How important were
the resources that were lost or threatened? How did the
informants perceive these losses? And what meanings
were constructed about the outcome of the crisis?
Analysis
The analytical process may be described as a continuous
pendulum between theoretical (re)assessment and empiri-
cal observation [28]. The general approach was partly built
on methodological frameworks developed by Corbin &
Strauss [29], and further developed by Emerson et al. [30].
Field notes were initially written up as fully as possible and
later edited and organized into distinct themes, patterns,
and variations related to the research questions. This pro-
cess involved line by line categorization of paragraphs.
Non-corresponding events were grouped in a separate
category to investigate discrepancies between the theoreti-
cal framework and empirical observations. Field notes
were then sorted according to these categories, and rear-
ranged into new data sets by collecting together all data
fragments that were related to each category. In this way,
a sustained examination of the research questions was
provided by linking together a variety of discrete observa-
tions. These categories were also assessed against the gen-
eral understanding that derived from routinely
participating in activities in the field.
Findings
Conditions
According to COR-theory, conditions such as social sup-
port, employment and membership in organizations are
resources that may lay the foundation for access to
other resources. Collective conditions resources among
Tamils in Norway prior to the crisis included the secur-
ity of family members in the country of origin, integra-
tion in the Norwegian educational system and labour
market, feeling general social support in the Norwegian
society, membership in Tamil NGO’s, and relatively
stable social support networks.
Prior to the crisis
During the cease-fire agreement between 2002 and 2008,
the security of family members in Sri Lanka was better
than in many years, and many were able to travel back to
their country of origin. Tamils in Norway had been mar-
keted as “super immigrants” in the Norwegian public.
They had been well-integrated in the labour market, had
not depended upon welfare-services, had seldom been
involved in crime, and the level of education among sec-
ond generation Norwegian Tamils had been high [31-33].
Although they were reported to be less well socially inte-
grated [24], the Norwegian facilitator role in Sri Lanka
had provided Tamils with a general sense of social sup-
port in Norway. The Norwegian engagement in the peace
negotiations had resulted in regular media coverage of
the political development in Sri Lanka, and some Tamil
community leaders had been able to meet and talk with
Norwegian diplomats active in Sri Lanka.
In addition, through membership in Tamil NGO’si n
Norway, people were able to maintain meaningful activ-
ities related to the social conditions of Tamils in Nor-
way, as well as in Sri Lanka [26,34]. NGO’ss u c ha st h e
Norwegian Tamil Health Organization (NTHO), and the
Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO) allowed
Tamils to contribute to health- and development pro-
jects primarily in LTTE-controlled areas of Sri Lanka.
Donations to the Tamil Coordinating Committee
(TCC), the international political branch of the LTTE,
helped fund the activities of the LTTE in Sri Lanka.
TCC was also instrumental in forming the Tamil
Resource and Counselling Centre (TRCC). The centre
focused on the integration of Tamils in the Norwegian
society by providing courses and seminars on various
aspects of the Norwegian society, as well as tuition ser-
vices which gave Tamil children an improved chance of
completing higher education and participating success-
fully in the Norwegian labour market. At the same time,
mother-tongue tuition and cultural events were
arranged at the centre with the aim of maintaining a
sense of Tamil identity in exile [25].
Importantly, most of these Tamils indirectly regarded
themselves as part of the LTTE, which was not merely
perceived as a Tamil organization, but as the organiza-
tion of the Tamils:
The media and the UN don’t understand how
Tamils think. How can they claim that the Tigers
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from the battle zones? The international community
f a i l st ou n d e r s t a n dt h a tt h eL T T Eis the Tamils.
They don’t want to escape.
Although later investigations have concluded that the
LTTE was in fact forcefully using civilians as a shield
[11,12], the above statement by one informant during
the Vanni crisis encapsulates the general sentiment
within this part of the Tamil exile community at the
time. In this context, the perception of being part of the
LTTE did not imply participating on the battlefield, nor
necessarily formal assignment of specific tasks within
the organization. Rather, on a general level, it implied
the acknowledgment of the LTTE as (the sole) represen-
tatives of the Tamils in the struggle for Tamil Eelam.
This also enabled the mobilization of funds that accord-
ing to some researchers prolonged the secessionist cam-
paign in Sri Lanka [35].
Threats to the security of family members in the country of
origin
The Vanni crisis represented a serious threat to the
security of family members in the country of origin. No
reporters, international aid workers or UN officials were
allowed into the government’s No Fire Zone where hun-
dreds of thousands of Tamil civilians sought shelter.
Without independent observers within the area, reliable
information was mixed with rumours and propaganda.
Accordingly, the faith of friends and relatives within the
area remained uncertain. Many informants scoured
through Tamil websites on a daily, if not hourly, basis
looking for photos or reports of dead relatives or
friends. In February 2009 a Tamil family on the west
coast of Norway lost as many as 11 family members
within the No Fire Zone in one day. According to later
verified reports, the area was routinely shelled by gov-
ernmental forces [12]. Even after the LTTE admitted
defeat in May 2009, the security of family and friends in
Sri Lanka continued to be threatened as civilians and
surviving LTTE cadres were placed in internment
camps behind barbed wire. Reports of violence, rape,
disease and lack of food inside the camps generated
great concern among informants.
Threats to integration in the Norwegian society
In September 2008, UN staff left the conflict zone out of
security concerns, making many informants fear that the
lack of international observers would lead to war crimes.
By November 2008, Tamils in Norway started to mobi-
lize resources to attract public attention to the situation
in Sri Lanka. Hunger strikes, public rallies, torch proces-
sions and demonstrations were arranged. As time pro-
gressed and the situation in Sri Lanka became worse,
some became engaged in political lobbying and
attempted to mobilize the support of Norwegian
politicians and Norwegian diplomats previously involved
in the peace negotiations in Sri Lanka. Flyers were
printed, Facebook groups were established, and email
campaigns were organized to spread awareness about
the situation in the general public. To an extent, by
March 2009, public demonstrations became the new
communal meeting point for many Tamils. This even-
tually gave rise to a new set of concerns within this part
of the Tamil community.
In April 2009, many informants said they had heard
reports from Vanni that around 400 LTTE soldiers had
been killed by chemical weapons. Frustrated Tamils in
Oslo blocked the traffic, struggled physically with the
police, went on hunger strikes outside the Prime Minis-
ter’s office, and demanded that former Special Envoy in
Sri Lanka Erik Solheim should call for an emergency
governmental meeting. A group of young Tamils also
attacked the Sri Lankan embassy in Norway, and as a
result, Norway was officially relieved of their facilitator
role by the Sri Lankan government. Some Tamil parents
feared that young Tamils would also start to emulate
the acts of self-immolation of Tamils in other parts of
the world. All these public outcries made many Tamils
concerned with the effect of the situation on the long-
standing public image of Tamils as “super immigrants“
in Norway: “[T]he 12 000 Tamils in Norway have been
regarded as a success story in terms of integration in
the country; may this change now?” (Dagsnytt 18, NRK,
April 14
th 2009; translated from Norwegian). The fear
was that Tamils would be labelled “terrorists“ and “full-
time activists“:
“If the Tamils are so full of energy, they may just go
home to their island and fight for a free Sri Lanka
rather than going on a rampage in Norway and
destroying public property. The scum is doing too
well on public welfare. Treason to our nation!!!”
(Participant in public web debate, VG http://vgd.no/
index.php/samfunn/innvandring-rasisme-og-flerkul-
tur/tema/1469316/innlegg/; translated from
Norwegian.)
However, while members of Tamil NGO’sw e r e
becoming concerned with the public image of Tamils in
Norway, they observed that many younger Tamils had
other concerns: “T h e ys a yt h a ti td o e s n ’tm a t t e rw h a t
reputation Tamils in Norway have, because if everybody
dies in Sri Lanka, what is the point in living?”. Reflecting
on the general lack of public support at the time, a
Tamil community leader stated that
“I always thought we were well integrated in the
Norwegian society. But now I realize we are not. We
have only been integrated in the labour marked. If
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nation would have supported us.”
Another community leader expressed his sentiments
this way: “For the first time I feel like a refugee in Nor-
way”, after more than 20 years in the country.
Loss of feeling of social support
As the crisis in their country of origin developed into a
humanitarian disaster, many Tamils experienced a loss of
the general feeling of social support they had experienced
in Norway. The general lack of social integration among
first generation Tamils implied that many of them had
few ethnic Norwegian friends to turn to for emotional
support: “Id o n ’t know who to turn to”, a female infor-
mant said, “all other Tamils have the same problems and
can’t help me, and I don’t have any good Norwegian
friends”. At the same time, public support remained rela-
tively scarce. A point of major concern to many infor-
mants was that on February 3
rd 2009, Norwegian
diplomats and other co-chairs of Sri Lankan donor coun-
tries publically encouraged the LTTE to surrender. Many
informants, on the other hand, had been expecting them
to condemn attacks on civilian targets by governmental
forces. Consequently, these official diplomatic statements
were described by some Tamils as “a stab in the back by
your best friend”. One informant noted that “The state-
ment was issued on the day before the National Celebra-
tion in Sri Lanka. Tamils regard this statement as a
declaration of support of the government’s warfare”.
In January 2009, the humanitarian crisis in Gaza had
engaged the Norwegian public to turn up in large num-
bers for public demonstrations. In contrast, during the
Vanni-crisis, which was described by the Norwegian
Minister of the Environment and International Develop-
ment in a press release as “the greatest humanitarian
crisis in the world”, there was very little public engage-
ment. Tamils found themselves marching in the streets
virtually on their own, and when the Norwegian public
did become engaged in the conflict, it tended to rein-
force the sense of abandonment many of these Tamils
felt at the time.
For instance, in March 2009, several international and
national NGO’s came together in Oslo to organize a
torch procession for civilians in Sri Lanka. In an attempt
at avoiding political controversy, LTTE symbols were
banned from the procession. This provoked many young
Tamils who clandestinely raised their Tiger flags while
the arrangers vainly attempted to physically restrain
them. Although the procession was organized to show
the Tamil population that the Norwegian public had
sympathy for their situation, Tamils completely outnum-
bered the few ethnic Norwegian participants in the pro-
cession. Out of around 1000 participants, around 40
Norwegians participated in the procession. Tamil
participants looked around and commented that “there
are not many Norwegians here”. From the perspective
of some Tamils, this attempted display of solidarity only
served to reinforce the distance between themselves and
the Norwegian public. Struggling to cope with his grow-
ing sense of alienation from the Norwegian society, one
informant framed his experiences this way: “There is no
God and no Norway”.
Threats to social support networks
Many informants stated that they had enough problems
coping on their own and had little support to provide
for others during the Vanni crisis. At the same time,
growing tensions and disarray within the Tamil commu-
nity started to become visible. Tamil parents struggled
to control Tamil youth who witnessed how their former
role models in the first generation coped badly with the
situation. Tamil community leaders were powerless to
prevent Tamil youth from raising Tiger flags during the
torch procession described above. Similarly, they could
not prevent them from attacking the Sri Lankan
embassy in Oslo. Other Tamil youth attempted to break
out and generate support networks by becoming
engaged in political lobbying. Their efforts to relieve the
situation in Sri Lanka were largely conducted without
involving members of the first generation of Tamil
immigrants in Norway. “They will only object to our
methods”, one young Tamil explained, “They don’t
know what they’re doing anymore”.
After the defeat of the LTTE in May 2009, new politi-
cal power structures also started to become visible
within the global Tamil Diaspora, partly reflecting old
fault lines within the LTTE. The result was that what
many informants had formerly experienced as a united
community became divided into fractions, and the pre-
viously well-functioning social support networks became
fragmented. Former friends found themselves on oppos-
ing sides, some families were divided, and some former
leaders withdrew from the TRCC in Oslo as a result of
political disagreements. Many informants stated that
this process contributed to aggravate their stress and
make it even more difficult to find social support. Since
this process was the result of certain changes in cultural
characteristics, it will be described more fully below.
Cultural characteristics
Cultural characteristics refers to cultural values and
modes of organization that may indirectly provide access
to collective resources. Collective cultural characteristics
resources among Tamils in Norway prior to the Vanni
crisis included a collective cause that provided a com-
mon focal point in exile, the valuation of self-reliance, a
sense of mastery, and belief in a just world.
Prior to the crisis
The common Tamil nationalist agenda had enabled
Tamils to effectively organize themselves across caste,
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enabled Tamils access to other resources described else-
where in this article, including the establishment of
NGO’s and social arenas in which resources such as
social networks, knowledge and organizational skills had
been collectively available.
These NGO’s also enabled Tamils to maintain a sense
of collective cultural identity in exile. In the context of
state oppression of Tamils in Sri Lanka, this was consid-
ered an important collective resource among the infor-
mants. Tamil identity in exile was not merely related to
Tamil language and culture, but also to the collective
memory of traumatic experiences in the country of ori-
gin. Thus, Tamil parents considered it important for
T a m i lc h i l d r e nt oj o i nT a m i lN G O ’s where they could
interact with other Tamil children and learn Tamil lan-
guage and culture. Equally important, however, was the
opportunity for their children to hear about the past
experiences of other parents at the centre, as well as the
ongoing experiences of Tamils in Sri Lanka. This collec-
tive memory of hardship and survival served as a moti-
vational factor to succeed in exile, and to contribute
towards improvement of social conditions in the country
of origin.
These Tamils also valued self reliance and aspired to
demand as little as possible from the Norwegian welfare
system. Tamils had seldom been associated with crime
or problems in the Norwegian media. Mistrust in gov-
ernmental agencies seemed to have influenced Tamils
throughout the civil war and the process of migration,
making them generate their own social support net-
works in exile and rely on their own collective resources
[36]. Among Tamils in Norway, public health services
were for instance regarded with some scepticism. Tamils
preferred to consult Tamil general practitioners with
their problems, or relied on ambulant health services
provided by Tamil NGO’s[ 2 6 ] .A sar e s u l to ft h i sg e n -
eral tendency towards self-reliance, Tamils were gener-
ally not considered a burden on the Norwegian society,
a factor which contributed to the marketing of Tamils
as model immigrants in the country. This ascribed iden-
tity had provided Tamils with a collective sense of mas-
tery and belief in a just world, and helped create
opportunities for growth (e.g., employment, education,
membership in voluntary organizations) in Norway.
Threats to the collective cause
When the LTTE was eventually defeated and its’ leader-
ship killed in May 2009, the collective cause seemed lost
to many. With the goal of a Tamil state appearing to be
lost, the effort to accumulate resources to reach towards
it made little sense to many Tamils at the time. The
initial sentiment, probably augmented by collective
symptoms of depression, was that it was pointless to
continue with the regular activities within the Tamil
NGO’s. On May 17
th, the Norwegian National day,
while Norwegians were busy celebrating their indepen-
dence, confusing rumours were circulating about
LTTE’s defeat in Sri Lanka. On this day, my field notes
read:
“[Name of informant] is dispirited; he has lost faith
in everything, the international community, justice.
T o d a yh ed o e s n ’t want to continue his work [in the
Tamil NGO’s]. ‘I feel I have given everything I can
to Norway, but Norway gave nothing back.’ He fears
that the community will dissolve, and that they no
longer have anything to unite around.
Ten days later, the situation was even worse:
“[Name of informant] says that “I had anticipated
that there would be a great deal of mental health
problems among Tamils in this situation, but it is
far worse than I had suspected.” The uncertainty of
[LTTE leader] Prabhakaran’sf a t e( i sh ed e a d ,i sh e
alive?) has brought about a great strain on many.
Many deny that he is dead, pointing towards the
confusing statements that have been made in the
press. At the same time, [name of informant] thinks
that the denial in itself may be a sort of mental reac-
tion, and that when it dawns on them that he [Prab-
hakaran] is actually dead,t h e yw i l lh a v ea ne v e n
bigger reaction. He repeats that all they have worked
for the last 30 years is gone. (Excerpt from field
notes, May 27
th 2009.)
Among first generation Tamils, the responses to the
military defeat were divided. Some were turning in sick-
leaves from work, signalling a general lack of motivation
which threatened to initiate a loss cycle. Others seemed
to cling to a small fragment of hope, denying the death
of LTTE leader Prabhakaran, and claiming that he
would resurface as he had done previously. The whole
situation contributed to create confusion and uncer-
tainty within the community.
Almost immediately following the defeat of the LTTE,
a ballot on the present validity of the political funda-
mentals of the Vaddukkoaddai Resolution of 1976 was
organized within the Diaspora as a potentially unifying
moment. According to the published results of the
referendum, 80 percent of the eligible voters turned out
for the referendum, and 99 percent of these endorsed
the renewed call for a sovereign Tamil state in Sri
Lanka [25]. Yet, new conflicts started to emerge con-
cerning the way to proceed from the current situation.
After the defeat of the LTTE in May 2009, Selvarasa
Pathmanathan (known as KP) who was proclaimed as
the new leader of the organization, called for an end of
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lomatic strategies. However, the so-called Castro-frac-
tion of the organization hesitated to acknowledge KP as
the new leader. Denying the death of Prabhakaran, they
rather called for a continuation of the Diaspora funding
of the LTTE [37]. Reflecting old fault lines within the
LTTE, two central democratic organizations eventually
emerged within the Tamil Diaspora. An unprecedented
initiative was made within the KP fraction to form a
democratic Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam
(TGTE) to unite the Tamil Diaspora. Meanwhile, the
Castro fraction formed the Global Tamil Forum (GTF),
a transnational Tamil civil society movement amongst
other things determined to:
“use all resources available to the Tamil Diaspora to
establish the Tamil people’s right to self determina-
tion and their right to re-establish their nationhood
which was taken by force away from them by suc-
ceeding colonial powers including the Sri Lankan
government” [38].
This political landscape contributed to dividing the
community into several fractions which marked the
emergence of what has been described as a paradigm
shift within pro-LTTE parts of the Tamil Diaspora, from
centrally organized activities to spontaneous and more
unstructured events [39]. The general impression from
long-term fieldwork within this community during the
period was that individual power was very limited. The
majority of Tamils involved in these new organizations
were hard working idealists struggling to make an
impact on the situation in Sri Lanka, but most of them
had little or no previous experience with international
politics. Hence, when viewed from the inside the power
struggle had more of a quality of disempowerment. As a
member of one of these new organizations suggested,
“They all talk about a power struggle. But the truth is
that none of us have any power at all”.
The sudden lack of unity within the community was a
source of concern for many, and some community lea-
ders refused to take part in any political agendas until a
return to unity had been ensured. Others felt pushed
out of the community as a result of the new disputes.
For whatever ambiguous reasons, the so-called “old
guard” remained loyal to the tradition of the LTTE.
They wanted to hold on to LTTE-related symbols and
the goal of a separate Tamil state in Sri Lanka. More
moderate Tamils found it unrealistic to lay claims to a
separate state in the current setting, and felt the primary
task was to rebuild the infrastructure in bombed villages
in Sri Lanka. Some of the latter quickly became referred
to as Quislings,t r a i t o r st ot h ec a u s e ,a n dr u m o u r s
circulated about candidly recorded phone conversations
that served to reveal these Quislings within the
community.
Loss of self reliance
Whereas self-reliance had been a major resource for the
Tamil community prior to the crisis, it proved to be a
terrible disadvantage during and after the crisis. One of
the problems was that Tamils seemed to face something
resembling a double bind: Overt support of the LTTE
undermined their credibility within the international
community, since the LTTE was an internationally con-
demned terrorist organization. Yet, overt criticism of the
LTTE undermined the credibility of individuals within
the Tamil community. While critisism of the LTTE had
been moderate before the crisis, to oppose the LTTE
after the loss was considered a blatant show of disre-
spect for the sacrifices of thousands of what these
Tamils regarded as “freedom fighters” in the home
country, while they themselves were living affluent lives
in exile. Consequently, Norwegian journalists often sta-
ted to me that Tamils they had talked to appeared to be
“brainwashed”.
The crisis made it clear that the Tamil community was
in desperate need of outside help. Initially there was a
need for help from the international community to inter-
vene in the conflict and save Tamil civilians trapped in
the line of fire. After the end of the war, there was a need
for help from the international community and the UN
to secure the human rights of Tamil civilians inside the
governmental internment camps. Eventually, there was a
need for social support from the majority community,
and for mental health services to help individuals,
families and the community cope with grief over losses of
friends and family. Although some welcomed the offer of
support from public mental health services to cope with
their grief, the general feeling among many informants
was that “nobody will help the Tamils”,A tt h es a m e
time, the crisis in the country of origin had a serious
impact on community functioning. When the crisis
intensified, most of the regular activities within the
TRCC and other Tamil NGO’s were cancelled. In addi-
tion, traditional rituals and celebrations were cancelled
out of respect for the ordeals of Tamils in Sri Lanka. As a
result, the fabric of social life within the Tamil commu-
nity broke down and the community entered into some-
thing resembling a state of emergency. Without these
collective social meeting points, social ties became wea-
kened and the community became more fragmented.
This created a need for outside support for resources
that were normally available within the community.
Threats to a sense of mastery and belief in a just world
The loss of the war and the lack of international support
contributed to a prevailing sense of defeatism and a lack
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2009, after the LTTE had admitted defeat, a young
informant perceived the situation in this way:
“We have just lost the war, our leaders are dead, our
guns are captured, we have three hundred thousand
civilians imprisoned in internment camps where a
humanitarian crisis is evolving, the UN is actually
financing the camps, and we have absolutely no
international support whatsoever. And we think we
can obtain a separate Tamil state just like that?”
Former UN spokesman in Colombo Gordon Weiss
suggests that the LTTE’s strategy had been to play out
the “CNN effect” of a brutal siege of Tamil civilians on
international public opinion [40]. Certainly, during the
initial stages of the crisis, Tamil informants put their
trust in the international community and the UN to
intervene in the conflict. However, Weiss argues that
the UN was hamstrung by the interests of some of its
most powerful members, making it clear that there
would be no resolution from the UN Security Council.
A year after the war, the International Crisis Group
called for an internal review of the UN’s conduct during
the war, suggesting that the organization was “close to
complicit” in government atrocities [41]. This resonates
with the general feeling of many informants during the
time.
Even after the war, in June 2009, the main despair of
many informants was that the UN helped finance the
barbed wired military controlled internment camps in
Sri Lanka amidst credible reports of rape, abductions,
general violence, malnourishment and outbreaks of dis-
ease within the camps [12,13]: “If we cannot trust the
UN, who can we trust?” Some of the community leaders
were concerned that this loss of belief in a just world
would result in a future renewal of the secessionist mili-
tary campaign in Sri Lanka, rather than spur democratic
engagement. Furthermore, they were concerned that it
would result in an “integration trauma” among young
Tamils in Norway. However, there were no clear signs
that this was actually taking place on a large scale.
In May 2011 however, the UN published a report of
the Secretary-General’s Panel of experts on accountabil-
ity in Sri Lanka [12] which spurred a renewed sense of
hope within the Tamil community. The report suggested
that there was credible evidence of war crimes and
crimes against humanity on part of the Sri Lankan gov-
ernmental forces during the final phase of the war. This
made members of the newly founded Tamil political
organizations more confident about their efforts, and
that it would be possible to convince the international
community that they had an obligation to hold the
responsible parties accountable for their crimes during
the war. By June 2011, a rekindled optimism was evident
among members of some of these Tamil NGO’s in Nor-
way, and people who had briefly been divided along
political fault lines were gradually starting to socialize
again.
Discussion
This paper has outlined how members of NGO’sw i t h i n
a refugee community were collectively affected by a
man-made crisis in their home country while living
comfortably in exile. Described as “super immigrants” in
the Norwegian society, these refugees experienced a
radical breakdown of collective coping resources during
the last phases of the civil war in their country of origin.
This suggests that man-made crises in the country of
origin may have a serious impact on refugee commu-
nities in exile, particularly on groups who are politically
orientated.
A possible limitation of the study could be that it
mainly focused on Tamils who supported LTTE, making
the findings less valid for Tamils without this political
orientation. However, the results of the referendum
referred to above suggests that the separatist cause had
a strong following among Norwegian Tamils at the time
of the fieldwork [25]. The collective cause had provided
these Tamils with a collective focal point in exile, and
enabled them to organize themselves effectively across
social distinctions. When this central collective resource
was threatened, it led to threats to other collective
resources as well. Yet, threats to collective resources
such as the security of family members in the country
of origin, and belief in a just world were not exclusively
linked to politically orientated Tamils, and are likely to
apply to other Tamils in the country as well.
Another limitation of the study is that correlations
between resource loss and mental health problems
among the participants have not been systematically
investigated. A randomized controlled study could have
provided us with a more detailed knowledge about rela-
tionships between crisis, resources and individual mental
health. Previous research has demonstrated that serious
resource loss in distinct resource categories predicts
mental health problems [19-21]. Up until the Vanni cri-
sis, studies on the mental health of Tamils in Norway
have described a well coping community [34,42]. How-
ever, high rates of symptoms of depression, anxiety and
bodily pains have been reported in a study among
Tamils in Norway during the Vanni crisis [43]. The
study shows that around 70% of the participants scored
above clinical cutoff points for depression, while 35% of
the participants scored above clinical cutoff points for
anxiety. Importantly, around half of the participants in
the cited study reported that their problems had an
effect on their relationship with their children. Almost
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period as a result of their mental health problems. It is
likely that there is a connection between the serious
mental health problems described in the above study
and the threats to and loss of collective resources
described in the current study. While this is beyond the
scope of the current study, there is a need for more sys-
tematic studies of collective resource loss and collective
mental health problems among refugees during crises in
the country of origin.
Somasundaram [44] has reminded us that a broader,
holistic perspective may become paramount in non-wes-
tern “collectivist” societies which have traditionally been
family or community oriented, and where individuals
tend to become submerged in wider concerns. In con-
trast, western research and conceptualizations have been
largely individualistic in orientation. In more collectivis-
tic or co-operative societies, Somasundaram argues, we
may need to go beyond the individual to the family,
group, and community in order to more fully under-
stand the individual, whether the concern is responses
to stress or designing interventions. His arguments
remain particularly valid in this context, since they are
based on a study among Tamils internally displaced by
the civil war in Sri Lanka. The study showed that family
and community life had suffered due to deaths, separa-
tion and deprivations. Furthermore, relationships, trust,
cohesion, beliefs and ethical values had declined, giving
rise to conflict, bitterness, suspicion and sorrow. This
process seems to be echoed in the current study among
Tamils geographically far removed from the actual con-
flict zone, and reminds us of the importance of main-
taining a methodological focus on individuals situated
within a group or community context.
The impact of the disaster in Sri Lanka on the Tamil
exile community far removed from the disaster seems to
largely follow the same patterns as the impact of disas-
ters on communities that experience it directly. Connec-
tions between a breakdown of the fabric of social life
and levels of distress within the community following a
disaster have been well documented. For instance, a
study within six Guinean communities attacked by
Sierra Leonan and Liberian RUF forces at the beginning
of the millennium [45], shows that communities that
disregarded community rituals and social support
tended to have higher rates of distress. Communities
that had concertedly resisted post-conflict social change
had lower rates of distress. A study following the 2004
Tsunami in Tamil Nadu, India showed that resilient
communities united among themselves, reduced com-
munal conflicts, and maintained traditional rituals [46].
The current study, then, adds to the growing body of
evidence suggesting a debilitating pattern of social
response to disasters [7-10]. Fragmentation of
communities following this type of disaster has been
documented in a number of contexts. Erikson [7] notes
that man-made disasters may force open fault lines that
normally run silently through the structure of the larger
community, splitting it into factions. De Vries [22] notes
that at a group level a conservative response to severe
stress may often take hold, involving a historical regres-
sion to idealized familiar conditions. Nationalism and
fundamentalism may become means of survival to
release individuals ideologically from an intolerable and
unmanageable complexity. The present study suggests
that this process may be augmented by loss of resources
such as a sense of mastery, belief in a just world, and a
general feeling of social support.
A major difference between the 2004 tsunami natural
disaster and the 2009 man-made Vanni crisis was the
response of the majority community towards the Nor-
wegian Tamil community. The fact that many Norwe-
gian tourists were also affected by the tsunami may have
made the Norwegian society more sensitive to the needs
of the Tamil community. A range of public interven-
tions and financial support programmes were initiated
at the time. For instance, bereaved Tamils were pro-
vided with financial support to travel back to Sri Lanka
to bury their dead and generally be of help to their
families and communities. They were provided with pro-
fessional counselling, support hotlines for bereaved,
temporary full time kindergarten, support groups, public
meeting places, financial support, fund-raising for survi-
vors on Sri Lanka, and memorial services [47].
I nc o n t r a s t ,w h i l et h e r ew a san e e df o ro u t s i d eh e l p
during and after the man-made disaster in 2009, it was
not forthcoming to the same extent. Norwegian diplo-
mats were involved in a complex diplomatic process,
but it largely occurred off the record, leaving many
Tamils with the general impression that nothing was
being done. In the end, the diplomatic negotiations
seemed to have little effect on the outcome of the war.
Furthermore, the sensitive political climate in Sri Lanka
following the LTTE’s defeat made it difficult for Norwe-
gian Tamils to travel back to Sri Lanka at the time, and
they were not offered financial support, at least not offi-
cially. Public interventions were far scarcer than during
the Tsunami, even after the Norwegian Institute of Pub-
lic Health issued a report of concern. Finally, the Nor-
wegian population largely remained absent in Tamil
public demonstrations. It is possible that this general
lack of support within the majority community during
the disaster was at least to some degree caused by the
fact that the LTTE was an internationally banned terror-
ist organization, creating a difficult political and moral
dilemma for local municipalities and the Norwegian
government. The fact that Norway had been among the
countries that did not ban the LTTE, and that
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gian public for their pivotal part in the previous peace
negotiations in Sri Lanka, did not seem to alter this
dilemma.
The study seems to support Hobfoll’s suggestion that
failure to gain resources after an investment may result
in burnout, ill health and a detrimental motivational
state [17]. An important observation is that what may
constitute cultural characteristics resources in one con-
text, may very well prove to become a disadvantage or a
strain in another setting. The emphasis on self-reliance
that had characterized the Tamil community prior to
the crisis seemed to have contributed towards their so-
called success in the Norwegian society. However this
characteristic put them at a serious disadvantage during
the crisis, when they were in desperate need of support
but had no outside support network, or international
political coalitions to rely on. This seems to echo the
observation previously made that one may invest in cop-
ing resources in a problem that subsequently turns out
to be a different one from the one initially envisioned.
As a result, coping resources may be drained at exactly
the moment when they are needed [26,48].
The study suggests that there is a need for more
research on the effects of man-made disasters in the
home country on the mental health of refugees in exile.
There is reason to believe that man-made disasters in
the country of origin may affect exile communities as
severely as natural disasters such as the 2004 tsunami;
and that they may have a need for help to cope with
these types of disasters as well. Previous research has
suggested that interventions should be early and inten-
sive to counter act loss cycles [49]. Replenishing dimin-
ished resources may enhance the coping capacity within
the community and reduce psychological distress. This
may imply efforts to assist refugee communities in
maintaining their fabric of social life. Models of disaster
recovery are built around a return to normal life and
stability after the disaster. However, as Couch & Mer-
curi [10] suggest, with man-made disasters, recovery
must often take place in the midst of ongoing threats.
Furthermore, recovery takes place within a social envir-
onment that, far from providing support, is often char-
acterized by destructive social conflicts and the
breakdown of community. Consequently, community
building and conflict management may help people cope
with the centrifugal forces set in motion by the disaster.
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